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THE TREATY POWER AND AMERICAN 
FEDERALISM, PART II 
Curtis A. Bradley* 
In an article published in this Review two years ago, I described 
and critiqued what I called the "nationalist view" of the treaty power.1 
Under this view, the national government has the constitutional power 
to enter into treaties, and thereby create binding national law by vir­
tue of the Supremacy Clause, without regard to either subject matter 
or federalism limitations. This view is reflected in the writings of a 
number of prominent foreign affairs law scholars, as well as in the 
American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States. In my article, I argued that this view was, 
among other things, inconsistent with the limited and enumerated 
powers structure of the U.S. Constitution. I also argued that this in­
consistency was becoming more significant, as the range of treaty­
making has expanded and as the Supreme Court has given new life to 
federalism restraints in the domestic arena. 
Recently, Professor David Golove published a 240-page article in 
this Review that takes issue with much of my analysis.2 Invoking con­
stitutional text, structure, precedent, and history, Golove attempts to 
set forth a broad-based defense of the nationalist view. Notwith­
standing our disagreements, there is much in Golove's article that I 
admire, and it is certainly an important contribution to the debate 
over the scope of the treaty power. Golove's historical narrative, while 
not without its difficulties, is particularly enlightening and reflects a 
prodigious amount of research. Unfortunately, the historical portion 
of the article is book-ended with discussions that are rather polemical 
and exaggerated in tone and substance.3 More importantly, those who 
* Professor, University of Virginia School of Law. For helpful comments and sugges­
tions, I thank Kathryn Bradley, Barry Cushman, Martin Flaherty, Jack Goldsmith, David 
Golove, Mike Klarman, Julian Ku, Daryl Levinson, Hiroshi Motomura, Bob Nagel, Steve 
Smith, Paul Stephan, Ted White, and John Yoo. For excellent research assistance, I thank 
Michael Bell and Cynthia Orchard. 
1. Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390 
(1998). 
2. David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the 
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000). 
3. For example, even though the scope of the treaty power has been vigorously debated 
throughout U.S. history - by serious scholars, prominent public officials, and federal judges 
- Golove proclaims that "the text and structure of the Constitution, as well as original in­
tent, leave little room for serious debate." Id. at 1078. 
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were looking for a full debate between Golove and myself over the 
scope of the treaty power are likely to be disappointed. Golove's arti­
cle, even with its historical discussion, largely fails to engage my cri­
tique of the nationalist view. 
In this reply, I will make four points. First, despite claiming to do 
so, Golove's article does not in fact defend the nationalist view that I 
critiqued. Second, Golove's proposed subject matter limitation on the 
treaty power reflects a false assumption about the views of other for­
eign affairs scholars and, more importantly, lacks any meaningful con­
tent. Third, Golove purports to accept the Supreme Court's recent 
federalism decisions as a baseline, but much of his analysis is inconsis­
tent with those decisions. Finally, Golove's historical discussion, while 
rich in detail, is both methodologically inconsistent and tendentious. 
I. THE "NATIONALIST VIEW" OF THE TREATY POWER 
In my original article, I coined the term "nationalist view" to refer 
to the proposition that the treaty power is limited neither by subject 
matter nor by the reserved powers and rights of the states.4 The fol­
lowing statement by Professor Lori Damrosch reflects the view I had 
in mind: " [T]he treaty-makers may make supreme law binding on the 
states as to any subject, and notions of states' rights should not be as­
serted as impediments to the full implementation of treaty obliga­
tions."5 One of the central claims of my article was that the two ele­
ments to the nationalist view - the lack of a subject matter limitation 
and the lack of states' rights limitations - had developed largely in 
isolation but were now being combined in academic commentary and 
in the Restatement (Third).6 If accepted together, I argued, these two 
elements of the nationalist view would give the treatymakers essen­
tially unlimited power vis-a-vis the states. I criticized this view as in­
consistent with constitutional text and structure, as well as with the 
Supreme Court's recent federalism decisions. 
The principal significance of the nationalist view is that it would 
allow the treatymakers the ability to circumvent federalism limitations 
otherwise applicable to the national government's exercise of law­
making power. Some commentators have suggested, for example, that 
Congress could reenact the Religious Freedom Restoration Act -
4. Bradley, supra note 1, at 393. 
5. Id. (quoting Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning 
"Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 515, 530 (1991)). 
For other examples of the nationalist view, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 302, 303 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD)); Lours HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
189-93, 197 (2d ed. 1996); Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA, 14 CONST. 
COMMENTARY 33, 46 (1997). 
6. Bradley, supra note 1, at 423, 433. 
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which was invalidated by the Supreme Court on the ground that it ex­
ceeded Congress's powers under the Fourteenth Amendment7 - as an 
implementation of an existing treaty commitment.8 Similarly, in a re­
cent case involving the Violence Against Women Act, a group of in­
ternational law scholars filed an arnicus curiae brief arguing that, even 
if the statute exceeded Congress's powers (as the Supreme Court ul­
timately concluded), it should be upheld as a valid implementation of 
a treaty.9 Commentators also have argued that the treatymakers have 
the ability to "commandeer" state legislatures and executive officials, 
notwithstanding Supreme Court decisions disallowing Congress from 
doing so.10 
At the end of my article, I considered various constructions of the 
treaty power that might reconcile the need for flexibility in interna­
tional negotiations with the structural principles of American federal­
ism. The best contemporary construction, I argued, was one that 
would allow the treatymakers the ability to conclude treaties on any 
subject but would limit their ability to create supreme federal law to 
the scope of Congress's power to do so. This construction would give 
the treatymakers substantial power to create supreme federal law, 
while at the same time preventing an end run around the federalism 
limitations applicable to Congress's creation of such law.11 As I ac­
knowledged, my proposed construction would probably require the 
limiting or overruling of the Supreme Court's 1920 decision, Missouri 
7. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
8. See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 5, at 52-53; Jeri Nazary Sute, Comment, Reviving 
RFRA: Congressional Use of Treaty-Implementing Powers to Protect Religious Exercise 
Rights, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1535, 1535-38 (1998). 
9. Brief of Amici Curiae on Behalf of International Law Scholars and Human Rights 
Experts in Support of Petitioners at 28-30, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) 
(Nos. 99-0005, 99-0029). The Supreme Court held that a portion of the Act was invalid be­
cause it exceeded Congress's powers; the Court did not mention the treaty argument. United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
10. See, e.g., Martin Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation? Federal Power vs. "States' Rights" 
in Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1277, 1279 (1999); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text 
and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 
108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1260 (1995); Thomas Healy, Note, Is Missouri v. Holland Still 
Good Law? Federalism and the Treaty Power, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1726 (1998); see also 
Neuman, supra note 5,  at 52 (suggesting that the New York anti-commandeering decision 
may not be applicable to the treaty power); Gerald L. Neuman, The Nationalization of Civil 
Liberties Revisited, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1650-55 (1999) (making same suggestion re­
garding the Printz anti-commandeering decision). 
11. Congress has substantial power, of course, to create supreme federal Jaw in both the 
domestic and foreign affairs contexts. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. 
Ct. 2288 (2000) (finding that Congress had preempted a state statute that was designed to 
restrict trade with Burma). In addition, some treaties do not depend on the creation of su­
preme federal law for their efficacy, and those treaties would be unaffected by my proposed 
construction even if they exceeded Congress's powers. Cf. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 
598 (1884) ("[A treaty] depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the 
honor of the governments which are parties to it."). 
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v. Holland,12 which upheld the statutory implementation of a migra­
tory birds treaty even though the statute may have been beyond Con­
gress's legislative powers at that time. 
Throughout his article, Golove describes himself as defending the 
"nationalist view" against my critique.13 In fact, the view that he de­
fends is, in many respects, narrower than the one I critiqued. Contrary 
to the conventional academic wisdom that I criticized, Golove accepts 
the possibility that much of the Supreme Court's recent federalism ju­
risprudence applies to limit the treaty power, and he also purports to 
accept a subject matter limitation on the treaty power. The only limi­
tation that Golove specifically argues against is one that would restrict 
the ability of the treatymakers to create supreme federal law to the 
scope of Congress's power to do so. In other words, Golove seeks only 
to defend a narrow version of the Court's holding in Holland. Conse­
quently, his article is not a defense of the nationalist view that I cri­
tiqued, but rather is a response to the particular construction of the 
treaty power I proposed at the end of my article. 
Golove begins by acknowledging that "treaties, like all other gov­
ernmental acts, are subject to the Constitution" and that treaties that 
violated specific constitutional prohibitions would be unconstitu­
tional.14 I would certainly agree, although there is some sweeping lan­
guage in Holland that could be read to the contrary.15 Next, Golove 
accepts the proposition that treaties are "in principle subject to the 
separation of powers restrictions which are applicable to ordinary acts 
of Congress."16 Again I agree, although Golove does not adequately 
distinguish the treaty power's relationship to separation of powers 
from its relationship to federalism.17 
12. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
13. See, e.g. , Golove, supra note 2, at 1080 ("In Part I, I set out the basic textual and 
structural arguments that support the nationalist view."). Occasionally, including in the title 
of his article, Golove refers to the "nationalist conception." He appears to treat that phrase 
as synonymous with "nationalist view." 
14. Id. at 1083. 
15. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433 ("Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only 
when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made 
under the authority of the United States. It is open to question whether the authority of the 
United States means more than the formal acts prescribed to make the convention."); see 
also Thomas Reed Powell, Constitutional Law in 1919-20, 19 MICH. L. REV. 1, 13 (1920) 
(noting that the Court's "hint that there may be no other test to be applied than whether the 
treaty has been duly concluded indicates that the Court might hold that specific constitu­
tional limitations in favor of individual liberty and property are not applicable to depriva­
tions wrought by treaties"). Some of the concerns regarding this language were resolved in 
Reid v. Coven, in which a plurality of the Court stated that, notwithstanding Holland, the 
treaty power was limited by the individual rights protections in the Bill of Rights. 354 U.S. 1, 
16 (1957). 
16. Golove, supra note 2, at 1084. 
17. Golove contends that "[n]othing in the constitutional text suggests that treaties are 
free of the requirements of the separation of powers," Golove, supra note 2, at 1098 n.53, 
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Most surprisingly, given some of the rhetoric in his article, Golove 
accepts that "treaties are not immune from federalism limitations."18 
He states, for example, that " [t]reaties have no general license to vio­
late the immunities of states any more than they may violate the rights 
of individuals. "19 Within such potential federalism limitations, he in­
cludes subject matter limitations, the doctrine of state sovereign im­
munity, and the Supreme Court's recent anti-commandeering limita­
tions. In other words, Golove accepts the possibility that much of the 
Supreme Court's recent federalism jurisprudence applies to limit the 
treaty power. Apparently, the only aspect of the Supreme Court's fed­
eralism jurisprudence that Golove does not believe applies to the 
treaty power are the Court's decisions concerning the subject matter 
scope of Congress's powers under Article I and the Fourteenth 
Amendment.20 At this point, Golove has, perhaps unintentionally, dis­
tanced himself from the views of many other commentators concern­
ing the implications of Holland.21 
but that is also true of the requirements of federalism. The text provides that treaties are the 
supreme law of the land and that states may not enter into treaties, but it does not provide 
that there are no federalism limits on the scope of the treaty power. Golove further argues 
that separation of powers principles are different because they "do not limit the subject mat­
ter or content of treaties," but rather "only require that certain subject matters not be regu­
lated in certain ways . . . .  " Id. at 1097 n.53. To the extent I understand this distinction, it ap­
pears to be inaccurate. If separation of powers limitations apply to the treaty power, they 
prevent treaties from making certain domestic changes (such as the creation of domestic 
criminal law or the appropriation of money) without the involvement of the House of Rep­
resentatives. See, e.g., Hopson v. Kreps, 622 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir. 1980); The Over the 
Top, 5 F.2d 838, 845 (D. Conn. 1925). Analogously, federalism limitations, if they apply to 
the treaty power, prevent treaties from making certain domestic changes without the states' 
consent. 
18. Golove, supra note 2, at 1085. 
19. Id. at 1086. 
20. Golove argues that these decisions are different from the other federalism decisions 
because they concern only lack of power, not "affirmative constitutional immunities of 
states." Id. at 1087. Golove makes a similar distinction in an effort to explain the Supreme 
Court's use in the nineteenth century of the "equal footing" doctrine to limit the treaty 
power. Id. at 1231 n.519. As discussed below, Golove's formalistic distinction, which he 
never defends, appears to be at odds with recent Supreme Court decisions. See infra Part III. 
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 302 cmt. d (stating that, because of 
Holland, "the Tenth Amendment, reserving to the several States the powers not delegated 
to the United States, does not limit the power to make treaties or other agreements"); 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 3.5.l, at 205 
(1997) ("The Court (in Holland] . . .  rejected the claim that state sovereignty and the Tenth 
Amendment limit the scope of the treaty power."); id. § 4.6, at 273 (because of Holland, 
"treaties cannot be challenged as violating the Tenth Amendment and infringing state sov­
ereignty"); RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE§ 6.5, at 575 (3d ed. 1999) ("Any Tenth Amendment 
limitation on the federal treaty power was flatly rejected in the landmark case of Missouri v. 
Holland."); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1317, 1343 (1999) ("[U]nless Missouri v. Holland is reconsidered, it appears that there 
are no limits on the treaty power grounded in state sovereignty."). 
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I certainly welcome Golove's partial repudiation of what I have 
called the "nationalist view." Unfortunately, Golove repeatedly de­
scribes his article as if it were presenting a full-fledged defense of that 
view, which makes his article potentially confusing. For example, he 
cites scholars and officials as supporting the "nationalist view" when 
they in fact (at most) supported only one component of it (usually the 
lack of states' rights limitations).22 Similarly, he asserts that the Su­
preme Court has endorsed the nationalist view,23 even though he ac­
knowledges elsewhere that the Court has never held that the treaty 
power is free from subject matter limitations - and, indeed, that it has 
suggested just the opposite. 
A good illustration of how Golove's use of the term "nationalist 
view" can be confusing is his treatment of the views of the nineteenth­
century statesman, John Calhoun. Golove relies heavily on statements 
by Calhoun that suggest the absence of reserved power limitations on 
the treaty power and argues that these statements show that "Calhoun 
seems to have accepted the nationalist view of the treaty power."24 
Golove does not mention, however, that Calhoun believed in a strong 
subject matter limitation on the treaty power. In Calhoun's view, the 
treaty power was to be "strictly limited to questions inter alios; that is, 
to questions between us and foreign powers which require negotiation 
to adjust them."25 To extend the treaty power beyond such truly inter­
national matters, he said, "would be to extend it beyond its allotted 
sphere; and, thus, a palpable violation of the constitution."26 By con­
trast, as long as the treaty power was limited to its proper subject mat­
ter, Calhoun believed, the treaty power would not unduly threaten the 
states' reserved powers. Indeed, in his view, the treaty power had 
rarely, if ever, been used to regulate in areas reserved to the states.27 
In this context, Calhoun's statements about reserved power limitations 
22. See, e.g., Golove, supra note 2, at 1114-15 (Thomas Jefferson); 1140 (James 
Madison); 1235 (John Calhoun). 
23. See, e.g., id. at 1193-1205, 1243-54. 
24. Id. at 1235; see also id. at 1091 (quoting Calhoun). 
25. JOHN C. CALHOUN, A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT AND A DISCOURSE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 203 (Richard K. Cralle ed., 
1851). 
26. Id.; see also id. at 253 ("(T]he supremacy of laws and treaties is expressly restricted 
to such as are made in pursuance of the constitution, or under the authority of the United 
States; which can, in no case, extend beyond the delegated powers.") (emphasis added). 
27. See Letter to Henry Wheaton from John Calhoun (June 28, 1844), in XIX THE 
PAPERS OF JOHN c. CALHOUN 211 (1990) ("From the beginning and throughout the whole 
existence of the Federal Government (the treaty power] has been exercised constantly on 
commerce, navigation, and other delegated powers to the almost entire exclusion of the re­
served which, from their nature rarely ever come in question between us and other na­
tions."). 
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are less surprising.28 This example shows why it is inadequate to focus, 
as Golove does through his redefinition of "nationalist view," on only 
one aspect of the scope of the treaty power.29 
Golove's criticisms of my arguments similarly end up getting dis­
torted because of his change in the definition of "nationalist view." 
For example, he contends that "Professor Bradley claims that 
Missouri is without historical foundation."30 The principal support for 
this contention is a statement in my article that "the nationalist view of 
the treaty power is unsupported by history. "31 I made clear in my arti­
cle that, however one reads the holding of Holland, it encompasses 
only part of what I was referring to as the nationalist view.32 I did cri­
tique Holland, but primarily on nonhistorical grounds.33 More gener­
ally, Golove errs in repeatedly referring to my critique of the nation­
alist view as the "states' rights" view,34 and in labeling me a "states' 
rights advocate."35 My critique was of an unlimited treaty power, not 
the lack of states' rights limitations on the treaty power per se. 
The problems with Golove's approach go beyond mere termino­
logical confusion. Golove's article is itself another example of the very 
problem I highlighted in my article: defenders of a broad treaty power 
artificially divide the subject matter issue from the states' rights issue 
and defend them separately. The principal tensions between the treaty 
power and American federalism, however, occur when these two ele­
ments of the nationalist view are combined, because it is this combina­
tion that would give the treatymakers essentially unlimited power to 
28. Moreover, Calhoun actually did believe that there were some (modest) states' 
rights-related limitations on the treaty power: 
[The treatymakers] can enter into no stipulation calculated to change the character of the 
government; or to do that which can only be done by the constitution-making power; or 
which is inconsistent with the nature and structure of the government, - or the objects for 
which it was formed. Among which, it seems to be settled, that it cannot change or alter the 
boundary of a State, - or cede any portion of its territory without its consent. 
CALHOUN, supra note 25, at 204. 
29. There are many similar examples of this problem in Golove's article. For example, 
Golove emphasizes statements in the Jay Treaty debates rejecting states' rights limitations, 
while neglecting to mention the many statements during the debates suggesting that the 
treaty power was limited at least by subject matter. Cf Bradley, supra note 1, at 414-15 
(quoting some of these statements); see also Charles A. Lofgren, Missouri v. Holland in 
Historical Perspective, 1975 SUP. Cr. REV. 77, 112 (explaining that there was a "consensus" 
in the Jay Treaty debates that the treaty power was limited by subject matter). 
30. Golove, supra note 2, at 1100; see also id. at 1079 (asserting that "the most recent 
attacks on Missouri contend that its holding finds no support in history"). 
31. Bradley, supra note 1, at 450 (emphasis added). 
32. Id. at 429. 
33. Id. at 433-50 (critiquing the textual and structural arguments in Holland) . 
34. See, e.g., Golove, supra note 2, at 1077 n.3, 1279. 
35. See, e.g., id. at 1100, 1147 n.216, 1188. 
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create preemptive federal law.36 Nowhere in his article does Golove 
come to terms with this point. A defense of the "nationalist view," as 
reflected in the Restatement (Third) and other commentary, has yet to 
be written. 
II. GOLOVE'S PROPOSED SUBJECT MATIER LIMITATION 
As noted above, Golove purports to be accepting a subject matter 
limitation on the treaty power. Indeed, he proclaims that, " [w]ere the 
President and Senate to make a treaty on a subject inappropriate for 
negotiation and agreement, and thus beyond the scope of the treaty 
power, the treaty would be invalid under the Tenth Amendment."37 
There is, as Golove acknowledges, substantial historical support for a 
subject matter limitation. To recite just a few examples, James 
Madison emphasized during the Virginia ratifying debates that "[t]he 
object of treaties is the regulation of intercourse with foreign nations, 
and is external;"38 John Calhoun, as noted above, stated in the mid­
nineteenth century that the treaty power was "strictly limited to ques­
tions inter alios; that is, to questions between us and foreign powers 
which require negotiation to adjust them";39 and Charles Evans 
Hughes suggested in 1929 that the treaty power was limited to matters 
of "international concern" and thus might not allow for the regulation 
of matters "which normally and appropriately were within the local 
jurisdictions of the States."40 Thus, given Golove's emphasis on his­
tory, his acceptance of a subject matter limitation is not surprising. It 
turns out, however, that his proposed subject matter limitation is 
premised on a false assumption and, more importantly, lacks any 
meaningful content.41 
Golove begins by suggesting that the subject matter limitation is a 
nonissue. He contends that, contrary to the claim in my original arti­
cle, neither scholars nor the Restatement (Third) have denied the exis­
tence of subject matter limitations on the treaty power.42 He is mis­
taken. As noted above, Professor Damrosch purports to be 
36. Bradley, supra note 1, at 433. 
37. Golove, supra note 2, at 1281; see also id. at 1086 ("A treaty that violates this [sub­
ject matter] limitation would be beyond the scope of the treaty power and thus would invade 
the sphere 'reserved' to the states by the Tenth Amendment."). 
38. 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTmITION 
1396 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993) [hereinafter 10 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY]. 
39. CALHOUN, supra note 25, at 203. 
40. Statement of Charles Evans Hughes, 1929 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 194, 194-96. 
41. Golove's proposed subject matter limitation is also ahistorical, a point which I return 
to in Part IV, infra. 
42. Golove, supra note 2, at 1100 n.61, 1288-90. 
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summarizing the state of the law when she states that "the treaty­
makers may make supreme law binding on the states as to any sub­
ject. "43 Similarly, Professors Barry Carter and Phillip Trimble state in 
their popular casebook on international law that the constitutional 
term "treaty" "has come to include any international agreement, re­
gardless of subject matter."44 And Professor Louis Henkin has argued 
that the Constitution's treaty clause "does not imply that an agree­
ment may deal only with certain subjects. "45 
The position of the Restatement (Third) is only slightly more com­
plicated. The first Restatement of Foreign Relations - the Restatement 
(Second), published in 1965 - had taken the position that the treaty 
power was limited to matters "of international concern" and further 
explained that treaties "must relate to the external concerns of the na­
tion as distinguished from matters of a purely internal nature."46 The 
Restatement (Third) expressly rejects this position, stating that, 
" [s]ubject to constitutional limitations . . .  the treaty power may be 
used to make international agreements of the United States on any 
subject."47 The "constitutional limitations" referred to, it explains 
elsewhere, are express constitutional prohibitions, most notably the 
individual rights provisions in the Bill of Rights.48 Such provisions may 
curtail the scope or application of particular treaties, but they do not 
define the proper subject matter of treatymaking. It seems clear, 
therefore, that the Restatement (Third) is rejecting a subject matter 
limitation on the treaty power. Golove suggests that the following 
statement in the Restatement (Third) reflects a subject matter limita­
tion: "the United States may make an agreement on any subject sug­
gested by its national interests in relations with other nations."49 While 
one could imagine a "national interests" limitation that had content -
for example, one that disallowed the regulation by treaty of matters of 
"local" concern - the Restatement (Third) surely was not suggesting 
such a limitation. Rather, when read in context, the Restatement 
(Third) was simply once again asserting - in contrast to the Restate­
ment (Second) - that treaties could be concluded on "any subject."50 
43. Damrosch, supra note 5, at 530 (emphasis added). 
44. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 176 (3d ed. 
1999) (emphasis added). 
45. Louis Henkin, "International Concern" and the Treaty Power of the United States, 63 
AM. J. INT'L L. 272, 273 (1969) (editorial comment). 
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES§ 117(1)(a) & cmt. b (1965). 
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 303 cmt. b (emphasis added). 
48. Id. § 302 cmt. b. 
49. Id. § 302 cmt. c.; see also Golove, supra note 2, at 1290 n.728. 
50. Moreover, the sentence in the Restatement (Third) immediately preceding the one 
Golove quotes invokes international law in a way that directly contradicts Golove's own 
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Unfortunately for Golove, the problems with his position only be­
gin with the mistaken assumption noted above. Not only have others 
rejected a subject matter limitation, but, upon close inspection, it turns 
out that Golove's own proposed subject matter limitation lacks any 
real content. His position, therefore, actually amounts to a rejection of 
a subject matter limitation - the very proposition that he denies any­
one supports. 
Like the Restatement (Third),  Golove rejects a subject matter test 
that would require that treaties address "external" or "international" 
matters.51 He also rejects limiting the treaty power to the subjects tra­
ditionally regulated by treaty when the Constitution was ratified.52 In­
stead, Golove suggests the following subject matter test: the United 
States can enter into any treaty as long as the treaty is intended to 
"advance[] the national interests of the United States in its relations 
with other nations."53 Although offered by Golove as a limitation on 
the treaty power, it is difficult to see how this test would have any lim­
iting force at all. If the President and Senate have decided to enter 
into a treaty with another nation, they presumably are of the view that 
it "advances the national interests of the United States" in its relations 
with that nation. And it seems inconceivable that courts would second­
guess this view, which presumably would require an examination of 
either the national interests of the United States, the subjective beliefs 
of the U.S. treatymakers, or both. Indeed, if anything is clear from the 
Supreme Court's foreign affairs and political question jurisprudence, it 
is that courts are not to engage in such second-guessing.54 Golove es­
sentially concedes this point.55 Thus, in truth, Golove's "limitation" 
proposed subject matter test. Whereas Golove's test would look to the purpose of the U.S. 
treatymakers, see infra note 53, the Restatement (Third) says: "States may enter into an 
agreement on any matter of concern to them, and international law does not look behind 
their motives or purposes in doing so." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 302 cmt. c. 
51. See, e.g., Golove, supra note 2, at 1289-90 (stating that the "international" subject 
matter requirement is "unjustifiable" and has been "widely rejected"). 
52. See, e.g., id. at 1291 n.730. 
53. Id. at 1090 n.41; see also id. at 1287, 1291 n.730. Golove describes this test as his 
"own interpretation" of the subject matter limitation on the treaty power. Id. at 1287; see 
also id. at 1090 n.41 ("I interpret this [subject matter] requirement to mean that the Presi­
dent and Senate can make any treaty which advances the national interests of the United 
States in its relations with other nations."). 
54. See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242-43 (1984) (referring to the "traditional 
deference to executive judgment '[in] this vast external realm'") (quoting United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 
(1981) ("Matters intimately related to foreign policy and national security are rarely proper 
subjects for judicial intervention."). 
55. See, e.g., Golove, supra note 2, at 1095 (acknowledging that "the President and Sen­
ate have a virtual carte blanche" in determining "the scope of the national interests . . .  to 
safeguard and advance through foreign negotiations"); id. at 1262 n.623 (noting the "tradi­
tional - and continuing - judicial reluctance to second-guess the motives of the political 
branches, particularly in the field of foreign affairs"); id. at 1292 ("For obvious reasons, 
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boils down to the proposition that the treaty power encompasses any 
treaty that the treatymakers decide to conclude.56 
This conclusion is confirmed by Golove's discussion of human 
rights treaties. He repeatedly insists that the civil, political, and other 
rights of U.S. citizens may be regulated by treaty, notwithstanding his 
proposed subject matter limitation.57 He tells us that the treatymakers 
could even regulate local criminal punishment - for example, by en­
tering into a treaty abolishing the death penalty.58 Such measures do 
not exceed the subject matter scope of the treaty power, says Golove, 
because the treatymakers have decided that human rights issues are 
important to the United States' international relations.59 This claim 
may be correct, but it confirms that Golove's approach would allow 
the treatymakers the ability to conclude agreements on essentially any 
subject they deem appropriate. 
Human rights treaties are in fact a likely (and understandable) rea­
son for the Restatement (Third) 's rejection of a subject matter limita­
tion. These treaties regulate the relationship between nations and 
their own citizens, often on subjects that have historically been consid­
ered matters of local concern. Moreover, they are not reciprocal in the 
traditional sense, in that the incentives to comply with them are not 
substantially dependent on other nations' compliance.60 This latter 
point has been emphasized in the decisions of a number of interna­
tional institutions. The International Court of Justice has stated that, 
with human rights treaties, "one cannot speak of individual advan­
tages or disadvantages to States, or of the maintenance of a perfect 
contractual balance between rights and duties."61 Similarly, the Hu­
man Rights Committee for the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights has stated that human rights treaties "are not a web of 
inter-State exchanges of mutual obligations" and that the "principle of 
courts do not feel free to second-guess the political branches on whether a treaty furthers 
our foreign policy interests."). 
56. Like most commentators, Golove would require that there be an actual agreement 
between nations rather than a "mock marriage." See, e.g., Golove, supra note 2, at 1090 n.41. 
But, as others have noted, that is not a subject matter limitation. See Henkin, supra note 45, 
at 274 (stating that the mock treaty limitation "does not suggest any limitations as to the 
subject matter of treaties"). 
57. See, e.g., Golove, supra note 2, at 1090 n.41, 1205 n.420, 1302-03 n.771. 
58. Id. at 1078, 1298 n.756. Golove states that such a death penalty treaty "could plausi­
bly be attacked as an abuse of the treaty power," but that, because it would "serve a foreign 
policy purpose," it would "thus be constitutional." Id. at 1298 n.756. 
59. See, e.g., id. at 1092 n.45, 1302. 
60. See Jack Goldsmith, International Human Rights Law and the United States Double 
Standard, 1 GREEN BAG 20 365, 369-71 (1998) (explaining this point). 
61. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, 19511.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28). 
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inter-State reciprocity has no place" in this context.62 Regional inter­
national institutions have made similar observations.63 
If the U.S. treaty power were limited to "international" or "exter­
nal" matters, or to truly reciprocal arrangements, human rights trea­
ties might be suspect. Indeed, this is precisely what a committee of the 
American Bar Association argued in a widely-discussed 1967 report.64 
As a result, Professor Henkin, before becoming Chief Reporter for 
the Restatement (Third), famously challenged such subject matter limi­
tations, expressing concern that they might be interpreted in a way 
that would undermine U.S. ability to enter into human rights treaties.65 
And the Restatement (Third) expressly refers to this issue in explaining 
its rejection of a subject matter limitation, noting that "[e ]arly argu­
ments that the United States may not adhere to international human 
rights agreements because they deal with matters of strictly domestic 
concern were later abandoned."66 Golove appears to be unaware of 
this recent history.67 In any event, his position, fairly read, is quite 
62. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 52d Sess., 1382d mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994). 
63. The Inter-American Court on Human Rights has stated that "modern human rights 
treaties in general, and the American Convention in particular, are not multilateral treaties 
of the traditional type concluded to accomplish the reciprocal exchange of rights for the mu­
tual benefit of the contracting States." Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the 
American Convention (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion No. OC-2/82, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R., ser. A: Judgments and Opinions, No. 2, 'II 29 (1982), reprinted in 22 l.L.M. 37, 47 
(1983). And the European Court of Human Rights has described the European Convention 
on Human Rights as "[u]nlike international treaties of the classic kind" because "the Con­
vention comprises more than mere reciprocal engagements between contracting States." 
Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 90 (1978). 
64. See Standing Committee on Peace and Law Through United Nations, American Bar 
Association, Human-Rights Conventions and Recommendations, 1 INT'L LAW. 600, 600-01 
(1967). 
65. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 152-56 (1972); 
Louis Henkin, The Constitution, Treaties, and International Human Rights, 116 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1012, 1014-15 (1968); Henkin, supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 302 reporters' note 2. Of course, the Re­
statement (Third) uses the passive voice here, leaving it unclear exactly who did the aban­
doning. But that is another issue. See Bradley, supra note 1, at 432-33. Although Professor 
Louis Henkin was the Chief Reporter for the Restatement (Third), my criticisms of it do not, 
as Golove puts it, "call[] Professor Henkin's integrity into question." Golove, supra note 2, 
at 1290. 
67. Despite insisting that human rights are proper subjects for the treaty power, Golove 
asserts at times that treaties must involve mutuality and reciprocity. See, e.g., Golove, supra 
note 2, at 1089, 1093, 1302. On this basis, Golove criticizes Professor G. Edward White for 
his suggestion that the migratory birds problem in Holland might have been addressed with­
out resort to a treaty. See G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Re­
gime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1, 71 & n.246 (1999). According to Golove, White 
"seems fundamentally to misunderstand the purpose of treaties," which, says Golove, con­
cern "tragedy of the commons" problems that cannot be solved by unilateral acts. Golove, 
supra note 2, at 1259 n.624. It is Golove, however, who seems to "fundamentally misunder­
stand" the nature of human rights treaties, since those treaties do not, in fact, concern trag­
edy of the commons problems. The United States still has strong incentives to protect the 
human rights of its citizens even if China, for example, fails to do the same. Golove also errs 
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similar to Henkin's and the Restatement (Third) 's - that is, he rejects 
any meaningful subject matter limitation. 
Ultimately, Golove ends up retreating to a pure political process 
limitation on the treaty power, saying that the "remedy for abuse" of 
the treaty power "lies ultimately in the people and not the courts."68 I 
criticized this political process argument at length in my original arti­
cle,69 and I do not wish to repeat the criticisms here. Instead, I will 
simply make two general observations. First, even with their require­
ment of two-thirds senatorial consent, there are some ways in which 
treaties may be less amenable to the political process argument than 
domestic legislation. In particular, the negotiation and drafting of trea­
ties is dominated by the Executive Branch, which is not particularly 
representative of state interests; the treaty process tends to be more 
opaque, and therefore potentially less open to democratic inputs, than 
federal legislation; and treaty commitments - particularly in modern, 
multilateral treaties - are often vague and aspirational, such that 
their precise consequences, including their consequences for state in­
terests, may become evident only after ratification.70 Golove does not 
address any of these aspects of treatymaking. 
Second, the two-thirds senatorial consent requirement does not 
even apply to executive agreements, which constitute the vast majority 
of international agreements concluded in recent years by the United 
States. Golove's only response to this point is to assert that, unlike 
treaties, executive agreements are not immune from federalism limita­
tions.71 He provides no explanation for this assertion, and many of the 
nationalist commentators he defends have asserted otherwise. In par­
ticular, these commentators have claimed that "congressional­
executive agreements" (executive agreements approved before or af­
ter the fact by Congress) are completely interchangeable with treaties 
and thus can be concluded whenever a treaty could be concluded.72 
in asserting that "[t)reaties and legislation are of essentially different characters, and to 
equate them is to make a category mistake of the first magnitude." Id. at 1093. By virtue of 
the Supremacy Clause, self-executing treaties ratified by the United States have the status of 
federal legislation. This distinguishes the treaty power from other Article II powers, such as 
the power to receive and appoint ambassadors. Moreover, under the well-settled "last-in­
time" rule, treaties are accorded essentially the same domestic law status as federal legisla­
tion. Bradley, supra note 1, at 457. Golove's categorical distinction also fails to take account 
of modem multilateral treaties, many of which resemble and are designed to operate like 
domestic legislation. Id. at 396-97. Finally, his distinction is at odds with his own position on 
congressional-executive agreements, which allows statutes to take the place of treaties. See 
infra text accompanying notes 73-75. 
68. Golove, supra note 2, at 1298. 
69. Bradley, supra note 1, at 440-45. 
70. Id. at 442-43. 
71. Golove, supra note 2, at 1307-08. 
72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5 ,  § 303 cmt. e ("The prevailing view is that the 
Congressional-Executive agreement can be used as an alternative to the treaty method in 
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Golove himself has asserted the same proposition in prior writings.73 
Indeed, in his article with Professor Ackerman, Golove specifically 
claimed (like the Restatement (Third)) that congressional-executive 
agreements are now interchangeable even for purposes of federalism 
limitations. He explained that, at first, the immunity from federalism 
limitations allowed in Holland was thought to apply only to Article II 
treaties, rendering congressional-executive agreements "constitution­
ally inferior to treaties."74 Through a World War II period constitu­
tional transformation, however, Golove argued that congressional­
executive agreements became fully interchangeable with Article II 
treaties.75 Whatever the justification, the conventional wisdom is that 
treaties and congressional-executive agreements are interchangeable, 
which makes the political process argument even more problematic. 
Ill. SUPREME COURT'S FEDERALISM DECISIONS 
One reason why the scope of the treaty power has become more 
important in recent years is that the Supreme Court has revitalized 
federalism restraints on the national government's power in the do­
mestic arena. This revitalization has taken a variety of forms. Most no­
tably, the Court has limited the reach of Congress's powers under both 
the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment;76 prohibited 
Congress from "commandeering" state governments in various ways;77 
and bolstered state sovereign immunity in both federal and state 
every instance." (emphasis added)); id.§ 302 cmt. d ("[T]he Tenth Amendment, reserving to 
the several States the powers not delegated to the United States, does not limit the power to 
make treaties or other agreements." (emphasis added)); HENKIN, supra note 5, at 217 (stating 
that the congressional-executive agreement "is a complete alternative to a treaty"). 
73. Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 
799, 805 & n.12 (1995) (citing the Restatement (Third) for the proposition that "there is no 
significant difference between the legal effect of a congressional-executive agreement and 
the classical treaty approved by two thirds of the Senate" and stating that the Restatement 
(Third) "expresses the widely prevailing view"); David M. Golove, Against Free-Form For­
malism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791, 1799 (1998) ("The longstanding majority view, and the set­
tled practice, is that treaties and congressional-executive agreements, whether ex ante or ex 
post, are wholly interchangeable." (emphasis added)). 
74. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 73, at 844. 
75. Id. at 857-60. This transformation, according to Ackerman and Golove, involved, 
among other things, a recognition by the Supreme Court of broad unenumerated foreign 
affairs powers - most notably in Justice Sutherland's opinion for the Court in United States 
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Id. at 858-59. In his response to my arti­
cle, however, Golove states that he does "not accept Justice Sutherland's notion of unenu­
merated foreign affairs powers and [is] skeptical about whether the Court today would still 
endorse his views." Golove, supra note 2, at 1089 n.36. 
76. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
77. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144 (1992). 
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courts.78 In my original article, I accepted this emerging federalism ju­
risprudence for the sake of argument,79 and I explored the potential 
implications of that jurisprudence for the treaty power issue.80 To 
avoid confusion, I noted that, like the current Supreme Court, my ref­
erences to the Tenth Amendment encompassed "any implied constitu­
tional limitation on [the federal government's] authority to regulate 
state activities, whether grounded in the Tenth Amendment itself or in 
principles of federalism derived generally from the Constitution. "81 
It is of course open to scholars to question the Supreme Court's re­
cent federalism jurisprudence, and many have done so. But this is not 
Golove's approach. Like me, he purports to accept this jurisprudence 
for purposes of his analysis.82 It becomes clear from Golove's discus­
sion of federalism, however, that he either disagrees with or misunder­
stands the Supreme Court's decisions. This is evident in at least four 
respects. First, Golove is dismissive of the tension between an unlim­
ited treaty power and the limited and enumerated powers structure of 
the Constitution, calling it a "retreat to arguments from first princi­
ples."83 Second, Golove repeatedly asserts that the Tenth Amendment 
is not relevant to determining the scope of the national government's 
delegated powers and, on this basis, claims that if the treaty power is a 
separate delegated power (as he argues it is), "no question of 're-
78. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 
(1996). 
79. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 1, at 394 ("I am not defending here the value of feder­
alism, or judicial review of federalism, subjects that have generated enormous literature."). 
80. I am not alone in raising that question. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, for example, 
notes in his recent treatise on constitutional Jaw that "[i]f a particular law violates the Tenth 
Amendment . . .  by placing an undue burden on state governments, then it is questionable 
why the same action would be constitutional if undertaken through a treaty." 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 274. Similarly, a recent casebook on constitutional Jaw lists 
Missouri v. Holland as a potential candidate for rethinking or overruling in light of the Su­
preme Court's recent federalism jurisprudence. DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD 
CENTURY 850 (2d ed. 1998). For other commentary considering the effect of the Supreme 
Court's federalism decisions on the scope of the treaty power, see, for example, Flaherty, 
supra note 10; Vazquez, supra note 21; James A. Deeken, Note, A New Miranda For Foreign 
Nationals? The Impact of Federalism on International Treaties that Place Affirmative Obliga­
tions on State Governments in the Wake of Printz v. United States, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L 
L. 997 (1998); Healy, supra note 10; Gavin R. Villareal, Note, One Leg to Stand On: The 
Treaty Power and Congressional Authority for the Endangered Species Act After United 
States v. Lopez, 76 TEXAS L. REV. 1125 (1998); and Omar N. White, Comment, The Endan­
gered Species Act's Precarious Perch: A Constitutional Analysis Under the Commerce Clause 
and the Treaty Power, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 215 (2000). 
81. Bradley, supra note 1, at 392 n.9 (quoting South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 511 
n.5 (1988) (alteration in original)). 
82. Golove, supra note 2, at 1083-88, 1279-86. 
83. Id. at 1078. Similarly, Golove dismisses the Founders' emphasis on the limited and 
enumerated powers principle in a footnote, saying simply that the principle (and other points 
emphasized by the Founders) "provide[s] little or no interpretive guidance." Id. at 1149 
n.222. 
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served' powers under the Tenth Amendment can arise."84 Third, 
Golove sharply distinguishes between the various strands of the Su­
preme Court's federalism jurisprudence, contending that restrictions 
on the national government's ability to "commandeer" states and 
override their immunity from suit (which he accepts may apply to the 
treaty power) are "an entirely different subject" from limitations on 
the scope of the national government's lawmaking powers.85 Finally, 
Golove also makes a sharp distinction between the Constitution's 
treatment of federalism on the one hand and its treatment of separa­
tion of powers and individual rights on the other (and on this basis jus­
tifies a differential relationship between them and the treaty power).86 
His position on each of these points is inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court's recent federalism decisions. 
A good starting point for considering the Court's recent federalism 
jurisprudence is the Court's 1985 decision, Garcia v. San Antonio Met­
ropolitan Transit Authority.81 In that decision, a 5-4 majority of the 
Court largely abandoned judicial enforcement of federalism limita­
tions on the national government's powers. The Court gave very little 
weight to the Tenth Amendment, mentioning it only once and ob­
serving that states retain sovereignty "only to the extent that the Con­
stitution has not divested them of their original powers and trans­
ferred those powers to the Federal Government."88 The Court 
concluded that " [s]tate sovereign interests . . .  are more properly pro­
tected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the fed­
eral system than by judicially created limitations on federal power."89 
In many ways, Golove's view of federalism is similar to the majority's 
view in Garcia. The Court's federalism jurisprudence, however, has 
moved a long way since Garcia. 90 
Beginning in 1991, with its Gregory v. Ashcroft decision,91 the 
Court has steadily given content to federalism-based restrictions on 
the national government's powers. In Gregory, the Court began by 
emphasizing the "first principles" derided by Golove: that the Consti­
tution created a national government of limited and enumerated pow­
ers. 92 The Court also expressed concern over alterations of the federal-
84. Id. at 1088. 
85. Id. at 1281-82; see also id. at 1086-87. 
86. Id. at 1083-84, 1285-86. 
87. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
88. Id. at 549. 
89. Id. at 552. 
90. See generally John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1311 (1997) (describing the Court's steady movement away from Garcia since 1991). 
91. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
92. Id. at 457-58. 
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state balance, especially when the alterations concern matters through 
which "a State defines itself as a sovereign. "93 The Court addressed 
these federalism concerns in Gregory by means of a strong "plain 
statement" rule. It explained that, "inasmuch as this Court in Garcia 
has left primarily to the political process the protection of the States 
against intrusive exercises of Congress' Commerce Clause powers, we 
must be absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise."94 
A year later, the Court went further, holding in New York v. 
United States that it is unconstitutional for Congress to "commandeer" 
state legislatures.95 The Court held that this was true even when Con­
gress is acting "well within" the subject matter scope of the Commerce 
Clause.96 Again, the Court began with the proposition that the Consti­
tution created a national government of limited and enumerated pow­
ers.97 The Court also, contrary to Golove's view, rejected any sharp 
distinction between federalism and either individual rights or separa­
tion of powers, explaining that, as with its division of power between 
the federal branches, "the Constitution divides authority between fed­
eral and state governments for the protection of individuals. "98 
There is, admittedly, some confusing and perhaps inconsistent lan­
guage in New York about the nature of the Tenth Amendment. In 
places, the Court suggests that the Tenth Amendment (broadly de­
fined as noted above) operates as a restraint on national power.99 In 
other places, the Court suggests that the Tenth Amendment simply 
states a "truism" that all powers not delegated to the national gov­
ernment are retained by the states and the people.100 And in still other 
places, the Court suggests that the precise nature of the Tenth 
Amendment is not important, at least in the case before it.101 Golove 
93. Id. at 460. 
94. Id. at 464. 
95. 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992). 
96. Id. at 173. 
97. Id. at 155. 
98. Id. at 181 (emphasis added). Justice Powell had made this same point in his dissent 
in Garcia: 
One can hardly imagine this Court saying that because Congress is composed of individuals, 
individual rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights are amply protected by the political proc­
ess. Yet, the position adopted today is indistinguishable in principle. The Tenth Amendment 
also is an essential part of the Bill of Rights. 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 565 n.8 (1985) (Powell, J., dis­
senting). 
99. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 188 ("The Constitution . . .  'leaves to 
the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty' . . .  reserved explicitly to the States 
by the Tenth Amendment." (citation omitted)). 
100. Id. at 156 (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)). 
101. See, e.g., id. at 177 ("Whether one views the take title provision as lying outside 
Congress' enumerated powers, or as infringing upon the core of state sovereignty reserved 
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naturally emphasizes the Court's "truism" description.102 But this was 
not the Court's only description of the Tenth Amendment in New 
York, and New York was not the Court's last decision on the subject. 
Moreover, the Court in New York, if nothing else, rejected the sharp 
distinction Golove draws between federalism restrictions based on 
lack of national power and structural federalism prohibitions on the 
exercise of national power, calling them "mirror images" of one an­
other.103 
The Court subsequently extended the holding of New York to pro­
hibit commandeering of state executive officials, in Printz v. United 
States.104 The Court concluded that, even though the statute at issue in 
that case was within the subject matter scope of the Commerce Clause, 
the measure in question nevertheless "violates the principle of state 
sovereignty."105 Again, the Court emphasized the structural principle 
of limited and enumerated powers. It also stressed the relationship be­
tween federalism and separation of powers, and the relationship of 
both to individual rights. It was obvious by this point that the Court 
was treating the Tenth Amendment (broadly defined) as a restraint on 
delegated powers. Indeed, two concurring justices, including the 
author of the earlier New York decision, stated this expressly.106 If 
there were any lingering doubts about this point, it was cleared up re­
cently in the Court's unanimous decision in Reno v. Condon.107 There, 
the Court stated as follows: "In New York and Printz, we held federal 
statutes invalid, not because Congress lacked legislative authority over 
the subject matter, but because those statutes violated the principles of 
federalism contained in the Tenth Amendment."108 
The "commandeering" decisions are only one strand of the Su­
preme Court's recent federalism jurisprudence. The Court also has 
imposed limits on the subject matter scope of Congress's delegated 
powers - in particular, Congress's powers under the Commerce 
Clause and under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Again, the 
Court has emphasized the limited and enumerated powers structure of 
by the Tenth Amendment, the provision is inconsistent with the federal structure of our 
Government established by the Constitution."). 
102. Golove, supra note 2, at 1280-81 & n.702. 
103. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 156. 
104. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
105. Id. at 923-24. 
106. Id. at 935-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The Brady Act violates the Tenth 
Amendment . . . .  "); id. at 936 (Thomas, J. , concurring) ("The Court today properly holds 
that the Brady Act violates the Tenth Amendment . . . .  "). The dissent in Printz argued, like 
Golove, that the Tenth Amendment "imposes no restriction on the exercise of delegated 
powers." Id. at 941 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
107. 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
108. Id. at 149 (emphasis added). 
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the Constitution.109 In light of that structure, the Court reasoned in 
United States v. Lopez that there must be limits on the scope of the 
Commerce Clause, and the Court rejected interpretations of that 
Clause that would allow Congress essentially unlimited power vis-a-vis 
the states, especially in areas in which the states historically have been 
sovereign. Similarly, the Court in City of Boerne v. Flores imposed re­
strictions on Congress's remedial powers under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, reasoning that " '[a]s broad as the congressional en­
forcement power is, it is not unlimited.' "110 
Most recently, in United States v. Morrison,111 the Court held that a 
portion of the Violence Against Women Act was unconstitutional be­
cause it exceeded Congress's powers under both the Commerce 
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court first confirmed 
what it had indicated in Lopez - "that even under our modern, ex­
pansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause, Congress' regulatory 
authority is not without effective bounds."112 Otherwise, the Court ex­
plained, "Congress might use the Commerce Clause to completely 
obliterate the Constitution's distinction between national and local 
authority . . . .  "113 In rejecting the dissents' argument that the political 
process provided sufficient protection against abuses of the commerce 
power, a majority of the Court once again linked the protection of 
federalism to the protection of individual rights. 114 The Court further 
emphasized the limited and enumerated powers structure of the Con­
stitution, and it concluded that "the Constitution reserves the general 
police power to the States."115 As for the Fourteenth Amendment ar-
109. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507, 516 (1997). Golove dramatically invokes Chief Justice Marshall's famous national 
power decisions, stating that "few would doubt that Professor Bradley's view is inconsistent 
with the great opinions of the Marshall Court in, inter alia, McCulloch and Gibbons." 
Golove, supra note 2, at 1282 n.706. As the Court observed in Lopez, however, McCulloch 
and Gibbons themselves emphasized the limited and enumerated powers principle. See 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) ("This (federal] government is 
acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers."); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) ("The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated . . . .  "). 
The same can be said about another famous Marshall decision. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ("The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and 
that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written."). 
110. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 128 
(1970) (alteration in original)). 
111. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000). 
112. Id. at 1748. 
113. Id. at 1752. 
114. Id. at 1753 n.7 ("As we have repeatedly noted, the Framers crafted the federal sys­
tem of government so that the people's rights would be secured by the division of power."). 
115. Id. at 1754 n.8. 
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gument in support of the Act, the Court stated again that " ' [a]s broad 
as the congressional enforcement power is, it is not unlimited.' "116 
A third strand of the Court's recent federalism jurisprudence con­
cerns state sovereign immunity. In Seminole Tribe v. Florida,117 the 
Court held that, even when Congress is acting withiri the subject mat­
ter scope of its Article I powers, it does not have the power to override 
state sovereign immunity. This is true, the Court held, even when 
Congress is exercising powers exclusively granted to it and denied to 
the states - such as the regulation of commerce with Indian Tribes. 
As the Court stated, "[e]ven when the Constitution vests in Congress 
complete lawmaking authority over a particular area, the Eleventh 
Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private 
parties against unconsenting States."118 The Court also made clear that 
the Eleventh Amendment, like the Tenth Amendment, reflects 
broader principles of state sovereignty than are expressed in the text 
of the Amendment.119 
The Court extended the Seminole Tribe decision in Alden v. Maine 
to hold that states have immunity from federal statutory claims even in 
state court.120 The Alden decision was particularly significant in that it 
brought together all three strands of the Court's federalism jurispru­
dence. All of these strands, the Court explained, concern the protec­
tion of a system of "dual sovereignty," pursuant to which states have 
the dignity and authority of sovereigns. The Court stated: "Although 
the Constitution grants broad powers to Congress, our federalism re­
quires that Congress treat the States in a manner consistent with their 
status as residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the governance 
of the Nation."121 The Court thus denied that its federalism jurispru­
dence was sharply divided in the way that Golove suggests.122 In other 
116. Id. at 1755 (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 128 (1970) (alteration in 
original)). Missouri v. Holland was invoked in Morrison - by the dissent. See id. at 1770 
n.18 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
117. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
118. Id. at 72. 
119. Id. at 54. 
120. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
121. Id. at 748. Like the dissent in Morrison, the dissent in Alden cited Missouri v. 
Holland. Id. at 807 (Souter, J., dissenting). Shortly before this Article went to print, the Su­
preme Court decided Solid Waste Agency, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 
99-1178, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 640 (Jan. 9, 2001). In that decision, the Court held that the Army 
Corps of Engineers had improperly construed a provision in the Clean Water Act as confer­
ring federal authority over isolated, intrastate bodies of water that are used as habitats by 
migratory birds. Id. at *7. That construction of the Act, the Court reasoned, would "raise 
significant constitutional questions." Id. at *25. The Court noted that it was reaching this 
conclusion notwithstanding the statement in Missouri v. Holland that the protection of mi­
gratory birds is a "national interest of very nearly the first magnitude." Id. 
122. The Court also applies federalism-protecting clear statement rules in all strands of 
its federalism jurisprudence. For recent examples, see Solid Waste Agency, Inc. v. United 
118 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:98 
recent sovereign immunity decisions, the Court has continued to 
analogize federalism protections to individual rights protections.123 It 
has also indicated, albeit in a brief per curiam decision, that the treaty 
power is limited by state sovereign immunity.124 
The Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence is still evolving, 
with many details not yet resolved. Nevertheless, at least one thing is 
clear: the Supreme Court's conception of federalism is very different 
from Golove's conception. Unlike Golove, the Supreme Court places 
great weight on the limited and enumerated powers principle; views 
the Tenth Amendment as relevant to the national government's dele­
gated powers; treats the various strands of its federalism jurisprudence 
as interrelated; and considers federalism limitations to be as important 
as, and intertwined with, other constitutional limitations. This is a sig­
nificant flaw in Golove's article, not because the Supreme Court's 
views are beyond question, but because Golove purports to be ac­
cepting them.125 
IV. GOLOVE'S USE OF HISTORY 
Although my original article had some historical discussion, it was 
not primarily focused on history. Nor is a reply article the proper place 
for a detailed historical account. As a result, my goal here is simply to 
raise some methodological questions about Golove's use of history 
and to highlight what I believe to be the tendentious nature of 
Golove's historical narrative. 
A. Methodology 
Much of Golove's article is focused on history, including but not 
limited to Founding history. Golove relies on this history to support 
specific constitutional arguments regarding the scope of the treaty 
States Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 99-1178, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 640 (Jan. 9, 2001); Jones v. 
United States, 120 S. Ct. 1904 (2000); and Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United 
States ex rel Stevens, 120 S. Ct. 1858 (2000). The treaty power has not been immune from 
such clear statement rules, either before or after Holland. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. United 
States, 304 U.S. 126, 143 (1938) ("Even the language of a treaty wherever reasonably possi­
ble will be construed so as not to override state laws or to impair rights arising under them.") 
(collecting cases). 
123. See, e.g., College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 
527 U.S. 666, 682 (1999) ("State sovereign immunity, no less than the right to trial by jury in 
criminal cases, is constitutionally protected."). 
124. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1998); see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 725 
(noting that, when it approved the Eleventh Amendment, Congress considered and rejected 
an exception for cases arising under treaties). 
125. Contrast this with the more defensible approach by Professor Martin Flaherty, who 
argues that the same scrutiny that I applied in my original article against the nationalist view 
should be applied to question the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence. Flaherty, supra 
note 10. 
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power. Nowhere in his article, however, does Golove identify his con­
stitutional methodology. The reader is left to wonder whether Golove 
is advocating a strictly originalist approach to the treaty power ques­
tion or something else. It is difficult to evaluate Golove's claims and 
criticisms, however, without knowing his methodological frame of ref­
erence. To take one example, Golove asserts that the proposal I set 
forth at the end of my original article (that the treatymakers' power to 
make supreme federal law should be limite.d to the scope of Con­
gress's powers to make supreme federal law) is "entirely extraconstitu­
tional in nature."126 An evaluation of that charge, however, would re­
quire some sense of what Golove believes is "constitutional in nature." 
There are suggestions in Golove's article that he assumes that I am 
an advocate of strict originalism. He declares, as if it were an answer 
to my article, that "Missouri is an originalist decision."127 He also ac­
cuses me of inconsistency, and even "sleight of hand," because I pre­
sented historical support for a subject matter limitation on the treaty 
power but then ultimately argued against such a limitation.128 It is not 
clear to me why Golove would have assumed I was a strict originalist. 
As I explained in my prior article, the principal purpose of my histori­
cal discussion was to rebut strong clairp.s made by proponents of the 
nationalist view, not to present an originalist argument for a limited 
treaty power.129 Indeed, the proposal I set forth at the end of my arti­
cle was presented as distinctly nonoriginalist. As I explained, given 
changes in the scope of Congress's legislative powers and in the scope 
and nature of U.S. treatymaking, "the answer to this question [about 
how federalism should be protected in the treaty context] may be dif­
ferent today than it would have been in the past."130 
If Golove is himself advocating strict originalism, then there is a 
substantial contradiction in his analysis. As discussed above, Golove 
purports to favor a subject matter limitation on the treaty power. He 
rejects, however, an originalist subject matter limitation - one that 
would limit the treaty power to "international," "external," or "tradi­
tionally negotiated" matters. Instead, he proffers a "national interests" 
test, which, as explained above, amounts to essentially no limitation at 
126. Golove, supra note 2, at 1310; see also id. at 1279 (describing my proposal as "en­
tirely without support in the Constitution"). 
127. Id. at 1101; see also id. at 1081 ("Contrary to the speculations of even some of 
Holmes's most sensitive interpreters, the opinion ultimately rests on standard constitutional 
premises (text, structure, precedent, and history) - indeed, originalist premises - not on an 
extraordinary theory of inherent foreign affairs powers or even on a view of the Constitution 
as an evolving or living text." (emphasis added)). In fact, given that the Court in Holland did 
not even refer to the Founding materials, Golove is being quite creative in describing it as an 
originalist decision. 
128. Id. at 1288, 1290-91.  
129. Bradley, supra note 1, at 409-10. 
130. Id. at 450. 
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all. Yet Golove never explains why it is proper to adopt an originalist 
position with respect to states' rights limitations on the treaty power 
(assuming he is right about the Founding history) and reject an origi­
nalist position with respect to subject matter limitations on the treaty 
power. He does suggest that a strict subject matter limitation would 
deprive the treatymakers of needed flexibility in this age of globaliza­
tion.131 Although that may be a strong functional argument, it is hardly 
an originalist one. 
There is, of course, more than one type of originalism.132 Some 
originalists insist that contemporary constitutional interpretation 
should replicate the precise understandings at the time of the Found­
ing; this is what I am calling "strict originalism." This version of origi­
nalism is probably most famously associated with former Judge 
Bork.133 Others argue that those understandings should be "trans­
lated" to take account of contemporary conditions. The most famous 
proponent of this version of originalism, at least in recent years, is Pro­
fessor Lawrence Lessig.134 Still others argue that there have been mul­
tiple "Foundings," each of which has changed the meaning of the Con­
stitution. The most famous proponent of this version of originalism is 
Professor Bruce Ackerman.135 In prior writings, Golove }ias advocated 
the last type of originalism, which, to borrow a phrase from 
Ackerman, could be called "constitutional moments" originalism.136 
Golove does not appear to be relying on constitutional moments 
originalism in his response to my article, perhaps because he believes 
that some other constitutional theory is sufficient for his purposes. In­
terestingly, though, there is a plausible argument that constitutional 
moments originalism leads to a conclusion contrary to Golove's posi­
tion. As Professor Peter Spiro has argued, there have been a number 
of events since World War II that are similar to the events that Golove 
has in other writings found sufficient to amend the Constitution.137 
Here is a brief summary of these events: 
131. Golove, supra note 2, at 1092 n.45. 
132. See generally Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1247 (1997) (discussing various types of originalism). 
133. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW 251-65 (1990). 
134. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 1165 (1993); Lawrence 
Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995). 
135. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). 
136. See, e.g. , Ackerman & Golove, supra note 73; David Golove, From Versailles to San 
Francisco: the Revolutionary Transformation of the War Powers, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1491 
(1999). 
137. Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1271-74 
(1999); Peter J. Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 
567, 576-78 (1997). 
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Before World War II, international law regulated primarily inter­
actions among nations and did not contain extensive individual rights 
protectionsP8 Soon after the War, with the experience of the 
Holocaust and other atrocities fresh in mind, the international com­
munity began to develop a comprehensive body of international hu­
man rights law. The seeds of this law were planted in the 1940s. The 
United Nations Charter, which came into force in 1945, contained 
general commitments to protect human rights.139 Three years later, the 
United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide and opened it for national 
ratifications. That same year, the General Assembly issued its non­
binding but nonetheless influential Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which contains broadly worded civil, political, economic, so­
cial, and cultural rights.140 Immediately following the passage of the 
Declaration, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights began 
drafting a human rights covenant aimed at converting the nonbinding 
provisions of the Declaration into binding treaty obligations. This pro­
cess eventually led to the promulgation of a number of human rights 
treaties, including the wide-ranging International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights.141 As many international law scholars have noted, 
the emergence of this human rights law regime constituted a truly 
revolutionary change in both the nature and scope of international 
law.142 
138. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, pt. VII introductory note, at 144; MARK 
W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 253-57 (3d ed. 1999). For a discus­
sion of the pre-World War II international law protections for human rights, see LOUIS 
HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLmCS AND VALUES 169-73 (1995). 
139. U. N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 3 (stating that one of the purposes of the United Na­
tions is to "promot[e) and encourag[e) respect for human rights and for fundamental free­
doms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion"); id. art. 55 (stating that 
the United Nations "shall promote . . .  universal respect for, and observance of, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion"); 
id. art. 56 ("All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation 
with the (United Nations) Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Ar­
ticle 55."). 
140. G. A. Res. 217(A)(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. N810 (1948). 
141. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, among other things, 
grants a right of self-determination, guarantees equal treatment, protects the "right to life" 
as well as "liberty and security of person," prohibits certain criminal punishments (including 
certain uses of the death penalty), requires various criminal procedures, limits immigration­
related measures, bars "arbitrary or unlawful interference with . . .  privacy, family, home or 
correspondence," and protects "the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion" 
and the "right to freedom of association with others." G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) U.N. GAOR 
(1966). 
142. See, e.g., Thomas Buergenthal, International Human Rights Law and Institutions: 
Accomplishments and Prospects, 63 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1988); Louis Henkin, Human Rights 
and State "Sovereignty", 25 GA. J. INTL. & COMP. L. 31, 36 (1995-96); John P. Humphrey, 
The Revolution in the Law of Human Rights, 4 HUM. RTS. 205 (1975); Louis B. Sohn, The 
New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1 (1982). 
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United States officials played a prominent role in initiating this in­
ternational human rights law regime. Nonetheless, in the 1950s there 
were intense debates in the United States over whether and to what 
extent the nation should participate in the regime. The principal sub­
jects of debate were the domestic implications of ratifying interna­
tional human rights treaties, including the implications for American 
federalism. As part of these debates, there were numerous proposals 
to amend the Constitution in order to limit the treaty power.143 Along 
with leaders of the American Bar Association, a key proponent of 
such an amendment was Senator John Bricker of Ohio, and the vari­
ous proposed amendments are commonly referred to jointly as the 
"Bricker Amendment."144 In general, the proposed amendments were 
intended to preclude treaties from being self-executing and to make 
clear that treaties would not override the reserved powers of the 
states.145 Some versions also would have restricted the use of executive 
agreements.146 One of the proposed amendments fell only one vote 
short of obtaining the necessary two-thirds vote in the Senate.147 
To help defeat the Bricker Amendment, the Eisenhower admini­
stration made repeated commitments that it would not use the treaty 
power in a way that would infringe on state prerogatives. Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles reassured the Senate in 1953 that the admini­
stration was "committed to the exercise of the treatymaking power 
only within traditional limits" and that he did not believe "that treaties 
should, or lawfully can, be used as a device to circumvent the constitu­
tional procedures established in relation to what are essentially mat­
ters of domestic concern."148 In 1955, Dulles further stated that the 
administration recognized that the treaty power could not properly be 
used for matters "which do not essentially affect the actions of nations 
in relation to international affairs, but are purely internal."149 In addi­
tion, the State Department published a Circular stating, in obvious 
reference to the Bricker Amendment debates, that " [t]reaties are not 
143. See, e.g., Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 and S.J. Res. 43 
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong. (1953). 
144. See generally NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE 
SENATE (1990); DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST 
OF EISENHOWER'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (1988). 
145. For example, some versions of the Bricker Amendment provided that "[a] treaty 
shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation which 
would be valid in the absence of treaty." TANANBAUM, supra note 144, at 224. 
146. For example, some versions of the Bricker Amendment provided that "[e]xecutive 
agreements shall not be made in lieu of treaties." ld. at 222. 
147. See TANANBAUM, supra note 144, at 180. 
148. Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 825 (1953). 
149. Hearing on S.J. Res. 1 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Judiciary Comm. , 84th 
Cong., 183 (1955). 
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to be used as a device for the purpose of effecting internal social 
changes or to try to circumvent the constitutional procedures estab­
lished in relation to what are essentially matters of domestic con­
cern. "150 For decades thereafter, no President attempted even to sub­
mit to the Senate major human rights treaties (although they did 
continue to seek the Senate's advice and consent for the Genocide 
Convention). Finally, a compromise was reached in the 1970s and 
1980s whereby the President and Senate would ratify some of the hu­
man rights treaties, but only with a package of limiting conditions, in­
cluding a federalism clause.151 This clause provides that the treaties 
"shall be implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that 
it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters cov­
ered therein, and otherwise by the state and local governments."152 
Combine this history with a post-Cold War isolationist Senate and 
the Supreme Court's revival of federalism restraints in the domestic 
arena, and you might have the makings of constitutional change, at 
least according to constitutional moments originalism. Perhaps this 
was what the Clinton Administration had in mind in the recent Breard 
v. Greene153 case. There, the International Court of Justice had issued 
a provisional order stating that the United States was to "take all 
measures at its disposal" to stay the execution of a Paraguayan inmate 
on death row in Virginia.154 In opposing efforts by Paraguay and the 
inmate to have the Supreme Court enforce this order, the Justice and 
State Departments filed a brief with the Court stating that, even if the 
United States was bound by treaty to comply with the international 
court's order, "our federal system imposes limits on the federal gov­
ernment's ability to interfere with the criminal justice systems of the 
States."155 Strangely, despite his use of the constitutional moments 
methodology in the past, Golove does not even consider its potential 
150. U.S. State Dep't Circular No. 175, para. 2 (Dec. 13, 1955), reprinted in 50 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 784, 785 (1956). 
151. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and 
Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399 (2000) (describing this development). 
152. U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 102d Cong., 138 CONG. REC. 8071, 'II 11(5) (1992). 
153. 523 U.S. 371 (1998). 
154. Id. at 374. 
155. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 51, Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 
(1998) (No. 97-1390). In this respect, the circumstances of the Breard case are similar to 
those of an earlier case involving a different international tribunal. In the mid-1980s, two 
individuals on death row - one in South Carolina and one in Texas - filed complaints with 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights alleging that their death sentences vio­
lated international law. The Commission asked the U.S. State Department to stay the execu­
tions while it considered the complaints. The State Department declined to do so, explaining 
that, under the U.S. federal system, there was no basis for executive branch intervention in 
the implementation of the sentences. See Case 9647 (Roach & Pinkerton v. United States), 
Inter.-Am. C.H.R. 147, OENSer.LN/11.71 , doc. 9, rev. 1, '1!'1! 11, 18 (1987). 
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application to the present issue. Even more strangely, given his writ­
ings, Golove strongly criticizes me for proposing that Holland should 
be limited or overruled, observing that if my proposal were accepted 
there would be constitutional change "without all the effort" of a for­
mal Article V amendment - the very thing advocated by constitu­
tional moments originalism.156 Of course, Golove's criticism is off the 
mark in any event, since a constitutional amendment is not needed in 
order to reassess a Supreme Court decision. But the criticism further 
highlights the methodological uncertainties underlying Golove's 
analysis. 
B. Law Office History? 
Whatever his constitutional methodology, it is clear that Golove is 
attempting to avoid the "law office history" charge made against many 
legal academics who base their arguments on history.157 To his credit, 
Golove has read and considered a vast array of primary and secondary 
materials, and his article is, as a result, very rich in detail. In addition, 
he does an admirable job of situating some of the debates over the 
scope of the treaty power within their historical context. Inattention to 
detail and context, however, are not the only elements of the law of­
fice history charge. A central complaint about the use of history by le­
gal academics (and judges) is that it is shaped and twisted in order to 
support a particular conclusion. It is in this sense that, notwithstanding 
its length, Golove's historical discussion may be considered law office 
history. 
Although there is much of interest in Golove's historical discus­
sion, there is also a noticeable one-sidedness to the discussion. There 
are many manifestations of this. Almost invariably, the historical ma­
terials that contradict Golove's conclusion are relegated to footnotes, 
frequently with a statement that goes something like this: "Unsur­
prisingly, Professor Bradley relies on this piece of evidence."158 When 
Golove encounters statements by officials that support limits on the 
treaty power, he often asserts that these statements must have been 
156. Golove, supra note 2, at 1312. I should make clear that I am not myself a proponent 
of constitutional moments originalism, in part because the theory appears to me to be too 
manipulable, with proponents of this theory finding only the constitutional moments that 
they like. For this and other criticisms of the theory, see RICHARD A. POSNER, 
OVERCOMING LAW, ch. 7 (1995); Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional 
Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. 
REV. 759 (1992); and Tribe, supra note 10. 
157. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 
95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 
1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119; John Phillip Reid, Law and History, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193 
(1993); Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship: The Case of History-In-Law, 71 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909 (1996). 
158. See, e.g., Golove, supra note 2, at 1149 n.22, 1205 n.421, 1225 n.499, 1234 n.528. 
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merely tactical or disingenuous, while accepting statements to the con­
trary (sometimes by the same officials) at face value.159 In addition, 
Golove frequently attaches his own pejorative labels to anyone who 
has argued for limits on the treaty power. For example, he states that 
the citizens of South Carolina were not engaging in " [r]ational discus­
sion" when they disagreed with the views of one Supreme Court Jus­
tice {William Johnson) concerning the scope of the treaty power;160 re­
fers to arguments for restrictions on the treaty power as "states' rights 
dogmas";161 and says that efforts in the 1950s to limit the treaty power 
by constitutional amendment (efforts that received the support of the 
American Bar Association and many Senators) were "shameful" and 
involved "virtual fanatics."162 Similarly, Golove often attempts a guilt­
by-association strategy, suggesting linkages {often no more than tem­
poral) between arguments for a limited treaty power and pernicious 
practices such as slavery and racial segregation.163 
Golove is also opportunistic in his use of sources. The reliability of 
sources in his article often seems to depend on whether they support 
his views. To take a few examples, he dismisses Madison's construc­
tion of the treaty power during the Articles of Confederation period, 
saying that it "would have seriously undermined Congress's ability to 
conduct foreign policy;"164 relies on what he perceives to be helpful 
statements from Madison during the ratification period;165 and dis­
avows Madison's view of the treaty power during the Jay Treaty de­
bates, suggesting (without much evidence) that Madison was acting as 
an unwilling front-man for Jefferson.166 Similarly, Golove relies on 
Jefferson's views during the Articles of Confederation period as sup­
port for the nationalist view and refers to his "heroic exertions,"167 dis­
avows the views of "the irrepressible Jefferson" during the Jay Treaty 
debate as reflecting "a legendary hostility to the treaty power,"168 and 
relies on Jefferson's views and actions as President.169 And Golove 
dismisses John Jay's statements during the Articles of Confederation 
159. See, e.g., id. at 1112, 1118-20, 1151 n.225, 1241-42 & n.552, 1272. 
160. Id. at 1222. 
161. Id. at 1236. 
162. Id. at 1274, 1275. 
163. See, e.g., id. at 1210-37, 1249-57. 
164. Id. at 1111. 
165. Id. at 1139-40. 
166. Id. at 1182-83. Golove's main evidence for this assertion is that Madison visited 
Jefferson's house shortly before writing the statements in question. Id. 
167. Id. at 1115, 1130-32. 
168. Id. at 1179, 1187. 
169. Id. at 1189-93. 
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period as strategic and disingenuous,170 while relying on them during 
the ratification period.171 There are many similar examples.172 
Another problem with Golove's treatment of history is that he of­
ten focuses on the treaty power issue in isolation from debates and un­
certainties concerning the supremacy of federal law and the scope of 
other national powers. For example, Golove presents evidence that 
the Continental Congress entered into treaties beyond its legislative 
powers, while downplaying the fact that it was unclear during the Ar­
ticles of Confederation period whether treaties had the status of su­
preme federal law.173 As discussed above, however, it is the creation of 
domestic federal law beyond Congress's powers that is the ultimate is­
sue in contemporary debates over the scope of the treaty power. In 
any event, the scope of the national government's legislative powers 
were uncertain during the Articles of Confederation period, such that 
it was not always clear whether treaties were in fact exceeding those 
powers. Thus, for example, John Jay reasoned in 1786 that the debts 
provision in the treaty of peace with Great Britain did not infringe on 
the rights of states because the power to confiscate wartime debts 
rested exclusively with the national government.174 Golove disagrees 
with Jay's reasoning,175 but the key point is not whether Jay was right 
or wrong but that there were uncertainties about the scope of state 
and national powers, making it unclear whether the treaties were in 
fact infringing on states' rights. 
Similarly, Golove repeatedly relies on treaties granting property 
rights to alien citizens as proof that the treaty power has historically 
exceeded Congress's legislative powers, but nowhere in his article 
does he conclusively show that, after the Constitution was ratified, 
Congress possessed no power to regulate the property rights of alien 
citizens. On the contrary, there are repeated hints in Golove's article 
that this and related issues of congressional power were uncertain and 
contested throughout the nineteenth century.176 Despite these hints, 
and despite the generally exhaustive nature of Golove's historical nar-
170. Id. at 1117, 1120, 1150-51 n.225. 
171. See, e.g., id. at 1137 & n.178. 
172. For example, Golove dismisses Attorney General William Wirt's states' rights 
views as "a too hasty judgment without adequate consideration and research," id. at 1205 
n.421, but later relies on other statements by Wirt that seem more helpful to his arguments, 
see id. at 1222 n.490; dismisses Edward Livingston at one point, see id. at 1176 n.309, but em­
braces him at another, see id. at 1225; and relies on Hamilton Fish when he sounds national­
istic, see id. at 1239, but not when he expressly supports states' rights limitations on the 
treaty power, see id. at 1242 n.552. 
173. Id. at 1102-03. 
174. Report from John Jay (Oct. 13, 1796), reprinted in 4 SECRET JOURNALS OF THE 
CONGRESS OF THE CONFEDERATION, at 204 (Boston, Thomas B. Wait 1820). 
175. Golove, supra note 2, at 1120 n.120. 
176. See, e.g. , id. at 1153 n.234, 1216 n.465, 1228 n.510, 1243, 1247. 
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rative, Golove does not pursue the issue.177 A similar omission occurs 
in connection with Golove's discussion of South Carolina's Negro 
Seamen's Act.178 Although Golove describes the legal controversy 
over that Act as if it were primarily focused on the scope of the treaty 
power, it was in fact primarily focused on the scope of the foreign 
commerce power, and the materials Golove relies on often invoke 
Congress's commerce power as the primary basis for invalidating the 
Act. Justice Johnson did so, for example, in his circuit decision in 
Elkison v. Deliesseline,119 yet Golove unhesitatingly describes him as 
"invoking the nationalist conception of the treaty power."180 Similarly, 
Golove relies on an opinion on this issue by Attorney General William 
Wirt as support for the nationalist view,181 even though the opinion re­
lies primarily on the commerce power.182 Golove states that it "seems 
safe to assume" that Wirt intended his reference to the treaty power to 
be separate and independent from the commerce power discussion,183 
but this is questionable in light of the fact that (as Golove notes) Wirt 
had earlier written an opinion clearly rejecting the nationalist view of 
the treaty power.184 
Finally, Golove's description of the historical materials is often ex­
aggerated. For example, he asserts that "states' rights limitations, 
though sometimes invoked, were uniformly defeated under the [Arti­
cles of] Confederation."185 In fact, there were serious states' rights ob­
jections raised against a number of treaties and treaty provisions dur­
ing this period. These objections were raised by prominent officials, 
including John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, and James 
Madison, and they led to the delay or nonratification of some treaties, 
the limitation of others, and the nonenforcement by and against the 
states of still others.186 Even the important Treaty of Peace with Great 
177. Golove does not cite a single Supreme Court decision before Holland clearly 
holding, or even clearly suggesting, that a treaty provision was beyond Congress's legislative 
powers yet nevertheless valid. Several Supreme Court Justices in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 
Dall.) 199 (1796), made such a suggestion, but they were discussing Congress's (much nar­
rower) powers under the Articles of Confederation rather than under the Constitution. 
Golove, supra note 2, at 1151-53. 
178. Id. at 1210-37. 
179. 8 F. Cas. 493, 494 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823). 
180. Golove, supra note 2, at 1216. 
181. Id. at 1222 nn.490-91 and accompanying text. 
182. See Validity of the S.C. Police Bill, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 659 (1824). 
183. Golove, supra note 2, at 1222 n.490. 
184. See Right of Aliens to Hold Property, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 275 (1819). Wirt's succes­
sor, Attorney General John Berrien, also rejected the nationalist view. See 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 
426 (1831). 
185. Id. at 1139. 
186. See, e.g., SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 
38-43 (1904); 1 GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
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Britain encountered significant states' rights objections. American of­
ficials maintained, for example, that the Continental Congress lacked 
the power to agree to a proposed article in that treaty addressing the 
issue of confiscated British estates.187 As a result, Congress ultimately 
agreed in the treaty only to recommend to the states that confiscated 
estates be restored.188 It was events such as these that Alexander 
Hamilton presumably had in mind when he stated in The Federalist 
that the lack of a commerce power under the Articles of Confedera­
tion "has already operated as a bar to the formation of beneficial trea­
ties with foreign powers."189 
Golove also asserts that, during the Founding period, concerns re­
garding the scope of the treaty power produced only suggestions re­
lating to the process for making treaties and did not produce any sug­
gestions for limiting the substantive scope of the treaty power. "At no 
point," says Golove, "did concern over the interests of the states lead 
UNITED STATES 280-85 (New York, Harper & Bros. 1860). Contrary to what Golove claims, 
these states' rights objections were not based on specific limitations in the Articles of Con­
federation. See Golove, supra note 2, at 1108-11. For example, objections were raised against 
an alien property provision in a proposed treaty with the Netherlands on the ground that, in 
James Madison's words, the provision might "encroach on the rights reserved by the federal 
articles to the individual States." James Madison, Report on Treaty with the Netherlands 
(July 12, 1782), in 4 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 411. Subsequently, John Adams de­
cided not to attempt to include the real property component of this provision in the treaty 
because, as he explained to the Dutch ministers, "Congress had not authority to do this, it 
being a matter of the interior policy of the separate States." Letter from John Adams to 
Robert Livingston (Oct. 8, 1782), in 5 THE REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC 
CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 803, 804 (Francis Wharton ed., Washington, 
Government Printing Office 1889). Neither Madison nor Adams made any reference in 
these statements to specific limitations in the Articles, and it is hard to see how any of those 
limitations (which concerned state imposts and duties) would even be relevant. Golove fur­
ther contends that Congress "disagreed with Adams's constitutional claim," Golove, supra 
note 2, at 1112-13, but there is nothing in the pages that Golove cites from the Journals of 
the Continental Congress showing any such disagreement. See id. at 1113 n.92 (citing 24 
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONG. 66 (Jan. 23, 1783)). 
187. See, e.g., Letter from John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and John Jay to Richard 
Oswald, British Commissioner, Nov. 4, 1782, in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS at 219 (Walter 
Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1832) ("[A]s this is a 
matter evidently appertaining to the internal polity of the separate States, the Congress, by 
the nature of our constitution, have no authority to interfere with it."). Golove asserts that 
the American officials were disingenuous in making this claim. The only evidence he offers 
for this assertion is that the officials ultimately agreed to treaty provisions that appeared to 
conflict with their claim. See Golove, supra note 2, at 1 117-20. There is a difference, how­
ever, between insincerity and compromise. 
188. See Preliminary Articles of Peace, Nov. 30, 1782, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 5, cited in 2 
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 96, 98 
(Hunter Miller ed., 1931) ("It is agreed that the Congress shall earnestly recommend it to 
the Legislatures of the respective States, to provide for the Restitution of all Estates, Rights, 
and Properties which have been confiscated, belonging to real British Subjects . . . .  "). 
189. THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), at 144 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
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to proposals to restrict the scope of the treaty power."190 In fact, this 
concern led to a number of proposals for clarifying or limiting the 
scope of the treaty power. For example, the New York resolution of 
ratification stated that New York was ratifying the Constitution on the 
understanding that "no treaty ought to operate so as to alter the con­
stitution of any state; nor ought any commercial treaty to operate so as 
to abrogate any law of the United States.''191 A different proposal 
came from the Virginia and North Carolina conventions. They pro­
posed in their resolutions of ratification that the Constitution be 
amended to make clear that "no treaty ceding, contracting, restrain­
ing, or suspending, the territorial rights or claims of the United States, 
or any of them, or their, or any of their rights or claims to fishing in 
the American seas, or navigating the American rivers, shall be made, 
but in cases of the most urgent and extreme necessity."192 And 
Pennsylvania proposed that "no treaty . . .  shall be deemed or con­
strued to alter or affect any law of the United States, or of any par­
ticular state, until such treaty shall have been laid before and assented 
to by the House of Representatives in Congress," and that treaties 
shall not be valid if "contradictory to the Constitution of the United 
States, or the constitutions of the individual states."193 
Golove's claim that the Anti-Federalist charges regarding the po­
tentially unbounded nature of the treaty power were "met with acqui­
escence, not denial"194 also overstates (or at least confuses) matters. 
Golove makes that claim when discussing the Federal Convention. In 
the Virginia Ratifying Convention, however, which had the most ex­
tended debates over the scope of the treaty power, the Federalists 
strongly disputed the Anti-Federalist charges. George Nicholas ar­
gued, for example, that the treatymakers could "make no treaty which 
shall be repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution, or inconsistent with 
190. Golove, supra note 2, at 1 135; see also id. at 1141 ("Crucially . . .  this concern [over 
an unlimited treaty power] did not lead to proposals to limit the scope of the power."). 
191. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITlfTION, As RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT 
PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 409 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1866) (amendment proposed July 7, 
1788) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES]. 
192. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1554 (amendments proposed by the 
Virginia Convention, June 27, 1788), and 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 191, at 245 
(amendments proposed by the North Carolina Convention, Aug. 1, 1788). The language of 
both states' seventh proposed amendments were identical in this regard. North Carolina also 
proposed that no treaties contrary to existing federal statutes should be valid unless and until 
the statutes were repealed. See id. at 246 (proposed amendment 23). Although Golove refers 
to the Virginia resolution, he inaccurately describes it as merely procedural in nature. See 
Golove, supra note 2, at 1 141. 
193. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITlfTION 
598 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976). 
194. Golove, supra note 2, at 1 134. 
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the delegated powers."195 Edmund Randolph contended that "neither 
the life nor property of any citizen, nor the particular right of any State, 
can be affected by a treaty."196 And James Madison explained that 
" [t]he exercise of the [treaty] power must be consistent with the object 
of the delegation" and that " [t]he object of treaties is the regulation of 
intercourse with foreign nations, and is extemal."197 The "external" 
nature of treaties was crucial, Madison emphasized, because when ad­
dressing such matters, the treatymakers "will feel the whole force of 
national attachment to their country."198 In light of these statements, 
as well as the proposed constitutional amendments and clarifications 
described above, it is difficult to understand the basis for Go love's as­
sertion that "there is only one statement . . .  in the whole debate over 
the Constitution - that even arguably supports the states' rights 
view."199 
Golove also overstates the degree to which Supreme Court prece­
dent resolved the treaty power issue prior to Holland. Most of the de­
cisions Golove cites as "affirming the nationalist view" simply held 
that valid treaties preempt inconsistent state law.200 Others failed to 
address the constitutional relationship between treaties and state law 
195. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1389 (emphasis added). Golove 
contends that Nicholas was just invoking the standard Federalist argument about why there 
was no need for a Bill of Rights, Golove, supra note 2, at 1148, but this misses the point. The 
standard Federalist argument was that there was no need for a Bill of Rights because the 
powers delegated to the national government were sufficiently limited in scope that they 
would not give the national government the ability to take actions that would infringe on 
individual rights. Bradley, supra note 1 ,  at 412 & n.124. By applying that argument to the 
treaty power, Nicholas was making clear that the Treaty Clause did not give the national 
government the ability to create preemptive federal law beyond the scope of its delegated 
legislative powers (and thus potentially infringe on individual rights). Nicholas had made a 
similar argument earlier in the debate about the Necessary and Proper Clause. 9 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITIJTION 1135 (John A. 
Kaminski & Gaspere J. Saladino eds., 1990). 
196. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1385 (emphasis added). In quoting 
Randolph's statement in the text of his article, Golove places an ellipsis in place of the refer­
ence to the rights of states, and relegates that reference to a footnote. Golove, supra note 2, 
at 1147. In the footnote, Golove contends that Randolph was just referring to the issue of 
whether a treaty could cede state territory, id. at 1147 n.216, but neither Randolph's state­
ment, nor the statement by Patrick Henry to which he was responding, was limited to that 
issue. See, e.g., 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1384-85 (statement by Patrick 
Henry) ("The Constitutions of these States may be most flagrantly violated without rem­
edy."). 
197. Id. at 1396. 
198. Id. If Golove were correct in suggesting that the Anti-Federalist charges accurately 
reflected the scope of the treaty power, it would mean that the treaty power would not be 
subject to any constitutional limitations, since that was one of their charges. See Bradley, su­
pra note 1, at 413. But Golove rightly rejects such a construction. 
199. Golove, supra note 2, at 1147. Golove is referring to the statement by George 
Nicholas, quoted above. 
200. See, e.g., Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 271 (1817); Ware v. Hylton, 3 
U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 236-37 (1796) (Chase, J.). 
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altogether.201 Indeed, in many of these cases, the validity of the treaty 
was not even argued by the parties. A good illustration of Golove's 
overstatement in this regard is his claim that the Court in Hauenstein 
v. Lynham202 "affirmed all of the essential grounds for the nationalist 
view."203 In fact, the Court in Hauenstein expressly declined to address 
the scope of the treaty power, noting that " [t]he only point of conten­
tion [in this case] was one of construction," and that "[t]here are 
doubtless limitations of this power as there are of all others arising 
under such instruments; but this is not the proper occasion to consider 
the subject."204 When the Court did refer to the scope of the treaty 
power in the nineteenth century, it frequently emphasized limitations 
on that power, including federalism limitations.205 
It is also inaccurate to suggest, as Golove does, that the only period 
of American history in which there has been substantial support for 
states' rights limitations on the treaty power was the period shortly be­
fore the Civil War, and that this support largely evaporated after the 
War.206 In fact, although the weight of academic commentary may 
have come to support a treaty power unrestricted by states' rights 
prior to Holland,207 there were repeated commitments to the states' 
rights view by U.S. officials all the way up to (and even after) the 
Holland decision. For example, in a number of instances in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, U.S. officials declined to en-
201. See, e.g., Orr v. Hodgson, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 453 (1819); Fairfax Devisee v. 
Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1812). 
202. 100 U.S. 483 (1879). 
203. Golove, supra note 2, at 1244. 
204. 100 U.S. at 490. 
205. See, e.g., Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) (stating that the treaty power 
could not effect "a change in the character of the [federal] government or in that of one of 
the States") (emphasis added); Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211,  243 (1872) (stating that 
the treaty power does not extend to subjects "inconsistent with the nature of our govern­
ment and the relation between the States and the United States") (emphasis added); Holmes v. 
Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 569 (1840) (stating that the exercise of the treaty power must 
be "consistent with . . .  the distribution of powers between the general and state govern­
ments"); New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 736 (1836) (noting that the 
federal government is "one of limited powers" and that its authority cannot be "enlarged 
under the treaty-making power"). 
206. See, e.g., Golove, supra note 2, at 1078 ("The 'states' rights view' predominated, if 
ever, only during the antebellum struggle, when the issue became entangled with the slavery 
question and the accompanying states' rights dogmas of the day."); id. at 1238 ("[T]he na­
tionalist view, in the aftermath of the Civil War, would again gain quick recognition as the 
dominant construction of the treaty power."). 
207. There were, as I explained in my original article, important academic dissenters 
during this period, most notably Henry St. George Tucker and William Mikell. See HENRY 
ST. GEORGE TUCKER, LIMITATIONS ON THE TREATY-MAKING POWER UNDER THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1915); William E. Mikell, The Extent of the Treaty 
Making Power of the President and Senate of the United States (II), 57 U. PA. L. REV. 528 
(1909). In addition, many academic commentators who rejected states' rights limitations ap­
peared to believe in subject matter limitations. See Bradley, supra note 1, at 421-22. 
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ter into negotiations concerning private international law treaties be­
cause of a concern .that the treaties would infringe on the reserved 
powers of the states.208 Similarly, even as late as a few years before 
Holland, U.S. representatives insisted that they could not agree to a 
treaty regulating certain labor conditions because those matters were 
within the reserved powers of the states.209 These states' rights con­
cerns continued to inhibit U.S. participation in private international 
law, labor, and other treaty regimes even after Holland.210 
CONCLUSION 
The scope of the treaty power has been debated numerous times 
throughout this nation's history. The issue has resurfaced in recent 
years for a number of reasons, including the Supreme Court's revitali­
zation of federalism restraints in the domestic arena and an expansion 
in the scope and range of U.S. treatymaking. As I explained in my 
original article, these and other changes have heightened the potential 
conflict between the treaty power and American federalism. This con­
flict is posed most squarely by what I have called the "nationalist 
view" of the treaty power, which would allow the treatymakers the 
ability to create supreme federal law without regard to either subject 
matter or federalism limitations. The nationalist view can be criticized 
on a number of grounds, not the least of which is that it appears to 
conflict with the limited and enumerated powers structure of the Con­
stitution. 
Despite its length and detail, Golove's article is largely unrespon­
sive to my critique. The article is off-track right from the beginning, 
with its unexplained redefinition of the term "nationalist view." It then 
runs into serious analytical difficulties when it tries to both embrace 
and reject a subject matter limitation on the treaty power and tries to 
both embrace and reject the Supreme Court's recent federalism juris-
208. See Kurt H. Nadelmann, Ignored State Interests: The Federal Government and In­
ternational Efforts to Unify Rules of Private Law, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 323 (1954); see also 
HAROLD W. STOKE, THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE FEDERAL STATE 187-88 (1931 ). 
209. See James T. Shotwell, Historical Significance of the International Labour Confer­
ence, in LABOUR AS AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM 41 (E. John Solano ed., 1920); see also 
STOKE, supra note 208, at 189. 
210. See Pitman B. Potter, Inhibitions Upon the Treaty-Making Power of the United 
States, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 456 (1934). The fact that U.S. treatymakers perceived federalism 
limits on their ability to enter into labor treaties after Holland also tends to undermine one 
of Golove's most surprising claims: that the Court in Holland was self-consciously inviting 
the federal government to use the treaty power to circumvent the Court's earlier decision in 
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), in which the Court had held that a child labor 
statute unconstitutionally invaded the reserved powers of the states. Golove, supra note 2, at 
1080, 1269, 1304. Further undermining Golove's claim is the fact that the Court reaffirmed 
Hammer two years after Holland and specifically held that Congress could not use its taxing 
power to circumvent the Hammer decision. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (The Child Labor 
Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 39 (1922). 
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prudence. Although Golove's historical research is an important con­
tribution to the debate, it is plagued by methodological inconsisten­
cies, and the tendentious and exaggerated way in which it is presented 
undermines its reliability. More fundamentally, Golove's article fails 
to appreciate the legitimate reasons why the treaty power question has 
been a persistent feature of American political and legal discourse, 
and why, in this age of globalization, the question once again merits 
our attention. 
